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Abstract—Smart Services using Industrial Internet of Things
(IIoT) applications are on the rise, but still more often than
not, traditional industrial protocols are used to interconnect the
entities of the resulting systems. These protocols are mostly
not intended for functioning in such a highly interconnected
environment and, therefore, often lack even the most fundamental
security measures. To address this issue, this paper reasons on
the security of a communications protocol, intended for Machine
to machine (M2M) communications, namely the Open Platform
Communications Unified Architecture (OPC UA) and exemplifies,
on a smart energy system, its capability to serve as a secure
communications architecture by either itself or in conjunction
with traditional protocols.
Index Terms—IoT, Security, Smart Energy, Protocols, Industry
4.0, M2M, OPC UA, Smart Services
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
This paper aims on reasoning on the security of the Open
Platform Communications Unified Architecture (OPC UA) for
the use in a smart energy system (a controller and its managed
devices). Concretely, it discusses whether using OPC UA is an
appropriate method to secure communications for an Internet
of Things (IoT)-based architecture that allows for advanced
algorithms in low voltage distribution grids to improve effi-
ciency and hosting capability. The original idea to provide this
communications was via the in the industry widely proliferated
protocol Modbus/TCP [1]. This protocol, however, is known
to have severe security deficiencies [2]. It has therefore to be
replaced or security-enhanced by another protocol. Both tasks
could be achieved by OPC UA, as it both provides a standalone
architecture for Machine-to-Machine Communication (M2M)
and there is work to run OPC UA with Modbus [3]. The
reason why OPC UA is deemed a suitable candidate for this
type of communications is its standardization, proliferation
and also its semantic interoperability [4]. This advanced
flexibility and control will then facilitate the advanced use
of renewable energy, as well as new service-based business
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models in the energy domain. Assuring the security of these
communications, however, is a fundamental prerequisite for
this intended technology to work without generating the risk of
large-scale cyberattacks and the protocol’s capabilities in that
matter are therefore . Another goal of this paper is to extend
the author’s previous work on the security of IoT protocols
[5] by adding a higher-level, industrial-use specification that
allows for industry 4.0 and energy domain use cases.
II. RELATED WORK
There is a security analysis of OPC UA commissioned by
the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) [6].
This work, however, was conducted over the course of the
year 2015 and does therefore not take into account newer
developments (see Section IV-B). In any case, as this work
is quite comprehensive, it servers as a starting point for
this paper, apart from the official OPC UA specifications in
particular the security model [7] and the profiles [8].
III. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
The Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture
(OPC UA) is a system architecture that is designed to exchange
command and control information between industrial sensors,
actuators, control systems, Manufacturing Execution Systems
(MES) and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) Systems [9].
It therefore operates on all of the four upper layers of the IEC
62264 Enterprise-control system integration norms [10]. The
architecture specifies the following [9]:
• The information model to represent structure, behaviour
and semantics;
• The message model to interact between applications;
• The communication model to transfer the data between
end-points;
• The conformance model to guarantee interoperability
between systems.
In order to provide a platform-independent infrastructure logic
to flexibilize host services for the Industrial Internet of Things
(IIoT), enabling Machine-to-Machine Communication (M2M),
it provides both a Client-Server and a Publisher-Subscriber
(PubSub) model. To model the actual data it defines three
encodings:
• The Extensible Markup Language (XML) [11];
• The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [12];
• A native, binary encoding (UA Binary).
It further defines some protocols to transfer the modeled data:
• OPC UA via the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP);
• Via the Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS);
• Via WebSockets.
The architecture is an advancement of the Open Platform
Communications (OPC), formerly called OLE for Process
Control model [9]. The latter historically derives from the
Microsoft Object Linking and Embedding (OLE)/Component
Object Model (COM) [13]. The protocol has been interna-
tionally standardized as IEC/TR 62541 [14] by the Interna-
tional Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). Therefore, it enjoys
widespread use.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section contains a threat model description to deter-
mine the security properties deemed necessary for the current
application, followed by an analysis of the OPC UA profiles
for their general security and their features countering the
identified threats.
A. Thread Model
An adversary targeting the smart energy controller may have
many potential goals (the list is non-exhaustive):
• Extract information to draw conclusions on power con-
sumptions, user behavior and billing information;
• Extract information to achieve credentials to administra-
tive accounts;
• Manipulate values to achieve altered billings;
• Take over the device to alter power flows;
• Issue commands that stop the device from functioning;
• Manipulate values to evoke illegal conditions that damage
the device.
Technique to achieve this can be categorized into the
following (according to the STRIDE methodology [15]):
• Spoofing of user identity;
• Tampering;
• Repudiation;
• Information disclosure (privacy breach or data leak);
• Denial of service (DoS);
• Elevation of privilege.
To analyze OPC UA an unsecured bidirectional communi-
cation line between an assumed intelligent energy manager
and a managed device was modeled in the Microsoft Threat
Modeling Tool 2016 [15], using generic data flows (see the
graphical representation in Figure 1). This yielded in 5 DoS
threats, 6 in privilege elevation, 3 in information disclosure,
2 in repudiation, 3 in spoofing an 4 in tampering (see Table
I for details). The next sections will reason on the possibility
to counter these threats using OPC UA.
Fig. 1. Graphic Threat Model Representation
B. Analysis
IoT connections for industrial usage should provide at
minimum the same level of security as the IEC 62351 standard
[16]. This standard, however, does not necessarily assure end-
to-end security [17]. Therefore, additional measures have to be
taken to secure to provide a thoroughly secured connection. As
stated in Section I, the OPC UA is deemed a suitable candidate
to fulfill this requirement and moreover provide end-to-end
security. It provides three cipher suites, all of which use the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) for symmetric encryp-
tion, Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)-based asymmetric encryp-
tion with Optimal asymmetric encryption padding (OAEP)and
Secure Hash Algorithm 2 (SHA2)-based systems for message
signing. All of these suites have a signature length of 256 bits,
channel nonce lengths of 32 bytes and asymmetric key lengths
between 2048 and 4096 bits , as well as they are using the
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode of operation [8]. These
combination of algorithms is currently deemed secure [18].
The only exception to the algorithms stated above is the use
of the Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1) in the RSA-OAEP-
SHA1 operation used for asymmetric encryption, which is,
however, not regarded as a security issue, as RSA-OAEP only
requires a hash function that has a neglectable possibility of
producing all-zero sequences, which SHA1 fulfills1 [19]. The
1These are, however, only the necessary, not the sufficient security proper-
ties. There is yet no formal security proof for RSA-OAEP-SHA1.
TABLE I
THREAT OVERVIEW
Potential Process Crash or Stop for Managed Device Denial Of Service
Data Flow Downstream Is Potentially Interrupted Denial Of Service
Potential Process Crash or Stop for smart energy controller Denial Of Service
Data Flow Upstream Is Potentially Interrupted Denial Of Service
Elevation Using Impersonation Elevation Of Privilege
Elevation Using Impersonation Elevation Of Privilege
Managed Device May be Subject to Elevation of Privilege Using Remote Code Execution Elevation Of Privilege
Elevation by Changing the Execution Flow in Managed Device Elevation Of Privilege
smart energy controller May be Subject to Elevation of Privilege Using Remote Code Execution Elevation Of Privilege
Elevation by Changing the Execution Flow in smart energy controller Elevation Of Privilege
Weak Authentication Scheme Information Disclosure
Downstream Data Flow Sniffing Information Disclosure
Upstream Data Flow Sniffing Information Disclosure
Potential Data Repudiation by Managed Device Repudiation
Potential Data Repudiation by smart energy controller Repudiation
Spoofing the smart energy controller Process Spoofing
Spoofing the Managed Device Process Spoofing
Spoofing the smart energy controller Process Spoofing
Replay Attacks Tampering
Collision Attacks Tampering
Potential Lack of Input Validation for Managed Device Tampering
Potential Lack of Input Validation for smart energy controller Tampering
underlying RSA-OAEP possesses a formal security proof [20].
A survey from the German Federal Office for Information
Security (BSI) regarded Basic256Sha256 as the most secure of
these suites [6]. This, however, referred to a previous version
(1.2), whereas in the current (1.4) the Aes256-Sha256-RsaPss
profile has been added. This profile differs from the former in
that it replaces SHA1 with SHA2 in asymmetric encryption
and the RSA Signature Algorithm Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (RSASSA-PKCS) version 1.5 with the Probabilistic
Signature Scheme (RSASSA-PSS) for asymmetric signatures.
As the latest version of the defining standard [21] both
recommends using SHA2 and requires using RSASSA-PSS
for robustness reasons, the newer profile Aes256-Sha256-
RsaPss is deemed superior over the one favored by the BSI.
Furthermore, the IEC standard from 2015 [22] defines TLS
1.0, 1.1 and 1.2 as means to secure communications, although
the newer technical specification by the OPC foundation only
provides TLS 1.2 as single choice. This standard provides
three choices for TLS, AES256 with RSA key exchange or
AES128 and AES256 with Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral (DHE)
key exchange, each using SHA256 for hashing and the CBC
mode. Further principally defined algorithms are AES-CTR
(symmetric encryption), RSA-PKCS15 (asymmetric encryp-
tion) and RSA-PKCS15-SHA1(signature) and P-SHA1 (key
derivation), but these are not used in any profiles and therefore
regarded as if not supported [8]. Table II provides an overview
of the cryptographic algorithms used in the different OPC UA
profiles.
In conclusion, using the Aes256-Sha256-RsaPss profile does
mitigate the threats to information disclosure. It does also
mitigate collision attacks and should, by specification, pre-
vent replay attacks in conjunction with a sequence number.
However, the BSI found out in its analysis that the provided
reference implementation deviated from this specification, as
the sequence number was not evaluated [6]. Other tampering-
related attacks are in the devices’ scopes rather than in
the protocol’s. This is similar to privilege elevation attacks;
impersonation attacks can be mitigated by providing proper
message authentication provided by the secure signatures in
the profile, albeit, the other attacks of this category are in the
clients’ scopes which also applies for client-based imperson-
ation (which must be mitigated by secure client authentication,
e.g. via secure passwords and/or second factors). Also, spoof-
ing of processes has to countered on the client. The threats
regarding DoS are infrastructural and, thus, need external
counter measures, except for message flooding, which can be
partially mitigated by rate limiting through artificial delays [6].
The repudiation is not explicitly stated, but non-repudiation
for sent messages is in general, as far the communications
protocol is concerned, provided by the usage of secure public
key authentication and for received ones an issue of thorough
logging, which is out of the protocol’s scope.
V. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
This paper showed that, in principle, OPC UA is suitable to
serve as a secure architecture for a smart energy controller and
its managed devices, either standalone or by designing Modbus
applications using OPC UA (for an example see [3]). This al-
lows for securing the application at a higher level, for with the
most secure options being the Aes256-Sha256-RsaPss profile
or TLS with TLS DHE RSA with AES 256 CBC SHA256.
TABLE II
CURRENTLY VALID OPC UA SECURITY PROFILES
Name Aes128-Sha256-RsaOaep Basic256Sha256 Aes256-Sha256-RsaPss TLS RSA AES 256 CBC SHA256 TLS DHE RSA AES nnn CBC SHA256
Symmetric Encryption AES128-CBC AES256-CBC AES256-CBC AES256-CBC AES128/256-CBC
Symmetric Signature HMAC-SHA2-256 HMAC-SHA2-256 HMAC-SHA2-256 HMAC-SHA2-256 HMAC-SHA2-256
Asymmetric Encryption RSA-OAEP-SHA1 RSA-OAEP-SHA1 RSA-OAEP-SHA2-256 RSA -
Asymmetric Signature RSA-PKCS15-SHA2-256 RSA-PKCS15-SHA2-256 RSA-PSS15-SHA2-256 RSASSA-PKCS15 RSASSA-PKCS15
Certificate Signing RSA-PKCS15-SHA2-256 RSA-PKCS15-SHA2-256 RSA-PKCS15-SHA2-256 RSASSA-PKCS15 RSASSA-PKCS15
Key Derivation P-SHA2-256 P-SHA2-256 P-SHA2-256 RSASSA-PKCS15 DHE
Complimentary to this, it is advisable to implement addi-
tional external measures to secure the solution against attacks
targeting the clients, provide rigorous logging facilities and
implement external anti-flooding provisions. This could be
achieved by segregating the M2M networks from traditional
ICT networks (and the Internet, except where a Virtual Private
Network (VPN) runs over the former) and also from each
other. This follows the principle of least privilege, where an
entity has only access to the particular resources it needs
and adds an additional layer of access protection as well as,
through this, protection against flooding-based and other DoS
attacks. In general, the approach of defense-in-depth should be
applied [23], making the best effort to security on any point
of the system, for which using a secure distributed system
architecture is the first step.
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